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This	  is	  a	  pre-­‐publication	  version	  of	  an	  article	  that	  has	  been	  accepted	  for	  publication	  in	  the	  European	  
Constitutional	  Law	  Review.	  The	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  version	  of	  the	  article	  will	  be	  published	  in	  December	  2014.	  	  
	  
	  
There	  are	  many	  things	  that	  distinguish	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  from	  its	  continental	  neighbours.	  One	  of	  
them	  is	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  written	  constitution.	  Another	  is	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  high-­‐speed	  rail	  network	  of	  
the	  type	  that	  many	  European	  countries	  built	  decades	  ago	  and	  now	  take	  for	  granted.	  The	  latter	  gap	  
may	  be	  filled	  by	  the	  construction	  of	  ‘HS2’,	  a	  new	  high-­‐speed	  railway	  that	  is	  intended	  to	  link	  several	  
major	  English	  cities.	  In	  contrast,	  there	  is	  no	  immediate	  prospect	  of	  a	  written	  constitution.	  However,	  
the	  decision	  of	  the	  UK	  Supreme	  Court	  in	  R	  (HS2	  Action	  Alliance	  Ltd)	  v	  Secretary	  of	  State	  for	  Transport	  
(‘HS2’),1	  in	   which	   the	   decision	   to	   go	   ahead	   with	   HS2	   was	   challenged,	   arguably	   points	   towards	   a	  
British	  constitution	  that—while	  still	  unwritten,	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  there	  being	  no	  uniquely	  authoritative	  
governing	  text—is	  richer	  and	  more	  complex	  than	   is	  usually	  supposed.	  And	  while	   it	  would	  be	  going	  
too	  far	  to	  suggest	  that	  the	  HS2	  case	  is	  as	  transformative	  of	  the	  UK’s	  constitutional	  landscape	  as	  the	  
HS2	  network	  might	  be	  of	  England’s	  rural	   landscape,	  the	  constitutional	   implications	  of	  the	  Supreme	  
Court’s	  judgment	  are	  nevertheless	  highly	  significant.	  	  
This	   paper	   argues	   that	   three	   aspects	   of	   the	  HS2	   case	   form	   part	   of	   a	   constitutional	   tableau	   that	  
exhibits	   characteristics	  which	   are	   either	  novel	   in	   themselves	  or	  which	  presuppose	   readings	  of	   the	  
constitution	   that	  are	   in	   some	  respect	  novel.	   First,	   the	  case	   acknowledges	   that	   the	  UK	  constitution	  
now	  differentiates	  between	  ‘constitutional	   legislation’	  and	  ‘ordinary	  legislation’—a	  legal	  distinction	  
that	   was,	   until	   very	   recently,	   entirely	   alien	   in	   the	   British	   context.	   Second,	  HS2	   indicates	   that	   the	  
former	  category	  may	  itself	  be	  hierarchically	  nuanced,	  some	  constitutional	  legislation	  (and	  principles)	  
being	  more	  fundamental	  than	  others—an	  insight	  that	   impacts	  upon	  the	  way	   in,	  and	  the	  extent	  to,	  
which	  European	  Union	   law	   is	  considered	  to	  enjoy	  primacy	   in	   the	  UK.	  Third,	  and	  most	  broadly,	   the	  
HS2	   judgment	   forms	   part	   of	   a	   wider	   narrative	   arc	   being	   advanced	   by	   the	   UK’s	   senior	   judiciary,	  
according	  to	  which	  the	  central	  notion	  of	  parliamentary	  sovereignty	  falls	  to	  be	  understood	  within	  a	  
constitutional	  framework	  that	  is	  increasingly	  rich	  in	  nature.	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The	  orthodox	  constitutional	  landscape	  
It	   is	  parliamentary	  sovereignty	  with	  which	  we	  must	  begin.	  Although	  HS2	  does	  not	  cast	  doubt	  upon	  
the	   veracity	   of	   accounts	   of	   the	   UK	   constitution	   predicated	   on	   the	   concept	   of	   parliamentary	  
sovereignty,	  the	  case—along	  with	  others	  that	  will	  be	  mentioned	  in	  this	  article—does	  much	  to	  alter,	  
or	  at	  least	  reimagine,	  the	  constitutional	  setting	  within	  which	  the	  concept	  is	  situated.	  As	  such,	  it	  has	  
important	   implications	   for	   our	   contemporary	   understanding	   of	   the	   constitutional	   significance	   of	  
parliamentary	  sovereignty,	  as	  well	  as	  (given	  the	  centrality	  of	  that	  concept	  to	  traditional	  readings	  of	  
the	  British	  constitution)	  for	  our	  understanding	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  constitution	  itself.	  	  
The	   orthodox	   view	   of	   the	   British	   constitution	   holds	   that—as	   Dicey	   put	   it—‘[t]he	   sovereignty	   of	  
Parliament	   is	   (from	  a	   legal	  point	  of	  view)	   the	  dominant	  characteristic	  of	  our	  political	   institutions’.2	  
On	  this	  view,	  the	  legal	  authority	  of	  the	  UK	  Parliament	  is	  limitless:	  it	  has	  ‘the	  right	  to	  make	  or	  unmake	  
any	   law	  whatever’,	   such	   that	   ‘no	   person	   or	   body	   is	   recognised	   by	   the	   law	  …	   as	   having	   a	   right	   to	  
override	  or	  set	  aside	  the	  legislation	  of	  Parliament’.3	  Although	  this	  claim	  about	  the	  extent	  of	  the	  UK	  
Parliament’s	   law-­‐making	  authority	   is	   an	  apparently	  extravagant	  one,	  Dicey	  acknowledged	   that	   the	  
legal	   position	   is	   qualified	   by	   political	   reality.	   Thus	   the	   apparent	   starkness	   of	   position	   in	   the	   UK	  
viewed	   from	   a	   purely	   legal-­‐constitutional	   perspective	   is	   somewhat	   ameliorated	   once	   a	   political-­‐
constitutional	   lens	  is	  applied,	  the	  untrammelled	  authority	  of	  the	  legislature	  being	  circumscribed	  by	  
realpolitik	  if	  not	  by	  law.	  	  
A	   second,	   and	   related,	   characteristic	   of	   the	   traditional	   vision	   of	   the	   constitutional	   order	   is	   the	  
absence	  of	  any	  hierarchy	  of	  legislation.	  This	  is	  not	  to	  deny	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  legal	  status	  of	  legislation	  
differs	  according	  to	  the	  constitutional	  status	  of	   its	  author:	  Acts	  of	   the	  UK	  Parliament,	   for	   instance,	  
are	   legally	   superior	   to	   any	   other	   form	   of	   domestic	   law;	   they	   therefore	   prevail,	   in	   the	   event	   of	  
conflict,	  over	  legislative	  instruments	  created	  by,	  for	  instance,	  devolved	  legislatures	  or	  administrative	  
authorities.	  However,	  hierarchy	   is	  absent,	  on	   the	  orthodox	  view,	  within	   the	  category	  of	   legislation	  
enacted	  by	  the	  UK	  Parliament.	  As	  Dicey	  memorably	  said,	  ‘neither	  the	  Act	  of	  Union	  with	  Scotland’—
upon	  which	   the	   very	   existence	   of	   the	  modern	  United	   Kingdom	   is	   founded—‘nor	   the	   Dentists	   Act	  
1878’—a	  statute,	  whose	  importance	  to	  dental	  practitioners	  notwithstanding,	  could	  never	  have	  been	  
regarded	  as	  constitutionally	  significant—‘has	  more	  claim	  than	  the	  other	  to	  be	  considered	  a	  supreme	  
law’.4	  On	  this	  view,	  it	  is	  impossible	  for	  legislation	  to	  enjoy	  any	  form	  of	  legal	  superiority:	  such	  a	  status	  
cannot	   accrue	   from	   its	   inherent	   constitutional	   importance;	   nor	   can	   such	   a	   status	   be	   legislatively	  
bestowed	  upon	  it.	  Like	  it	  or	  not,	  every	  Act	  of	  Parliament	  is	  the	  legal	  equal	  of	  every	  other	  such	  Act.	  	  
When	   the	   absence	   of	   a	   written	   or	   entrenched	   constitution	   is	   factored	   into	   the	   analysis,	   the	  
homogeneity	   of	   Acts	   of	   Parliament—viewed	   in	   terms	   of	   their	   strict	   legal	   status—results	   in	   a	  
relatively	   ‘flat’	  constitution	   in	   the	  UK.	  The	  upshot	   is	   that	  even	  primary	   legislation	  that	   is	   (or	  which	  
creates	   or	   recognizes	   principles	   or	   norms	   that	   are)	   constitutionally	   fundamental	   does	   not	   enjoy	   a	  
legal	   status	   any	   different	   from	   other	   primary	   legislation.	   According	   to	   this	   analysis,	   if	   a	   given	  
constitutional	   value	  or	   freedom	  enjoys	  a	  degree	  of	   resilience,	   then	   such	   resilience	  must	   consist	   in	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the	  political	  difficulties	   likely	  to	  attend	  legislative	  attempts	  to	  displace	  or	  curtail	   it,	  as	  distinct	  from	  
legal	  obstacles	  to	  doing	  so.	   It	   is	  against	  the	  backdrop	  of	  this	  conventional	  understanding	  of	  the	  UK	  
constitution	  that	  the	  HS2	  case	  falls	  to	  be	  understood	  (although,	  as	  is	  noted	  below,	  the	  case	  is	  in	  fact	  
not	   alone	   in	   pointing	   towards	   an	   analysis	   of	   the	   constitution	   somewhat	   at	   odds	   with	   the	  
conventional	  picture).	  The	  HS2	  case	  
In	  2010,	  the	  UK	  Government	  proposed	  the	  construction	  of	  a	  new	  high-­‐speed	  rail	  network	  linking	  the	  
cities	  of	  London,	  Birmingham,	  Manchester	  and	  Leeds.	  If	  built,	  it	  will	  be—as	  Baroness	  Hale	  DPSC5	  put	  
it	   in	   her	   judgment	   in	  HS2—‘the	   largest	   infrastructure	   project	   carried	  out	   in	   this	   country	   since	   the	  
development	  of	   the	   railways	   in	   the	  19th	   century’.6	  In	   the	  normal	   course	  of	   events,	   infrastructure-­‐
related	   decisions	   such	   as	   the	   routing	   of	   new	   rail	   lines	   are	   taken	   by	   administrative	   authorities.	  
However,	  the	  Government	  proposed	  that	  the	  legal	  permissions	  necessary	  to	  construct	  the	  new	  high-­‐
speed	  rail	  network	  should	  be	  granted	  not	  administratively	  but	  legislatively,	  by	  means	  of	  enacting	  a	  
‘hybrid	  bill’.	  This	  category	  of	  legislation	  has	  been	  defined	  by	  the	  Speaker	  of	  the	  House	  of	  Commons	  
as	   ‘a	   public	   bill	   which	   affects	   a	   particular	   private	   interest	   in	   a	  manner	   different	   from	   the	   private	  
interests	  of	  other	  persons	  or	  bodies	  of	  the	  same	  category	  or	  class’.7	  As	  Lord	  Reed	  JSC8	  explained	  in	  
his	  judgment	  in	  HS2,	  hybrid	  legislation	  is	  enacted	  in	  much	  the	  same	  way	  as	  regular	  legislation,	  save	  
that	   an	   additional	   stage	   is	   inserted	   into	   the	   legislative	   procedure	   in	   order	   that	   ‘objectors	   whose	  
interests	   are	   directly	   and	   specifically	   affected	   by	   the	   bill	   (including	   local	   authorities)	  may	   petition	  
against	  the	  bill	  and	  be	  heard’.9	  	  
This	  aspect	  of	  the	  process	  notwithstanding,	  the	  claimants	  sought	  to	  challenge	  the	  use	  of	  the	  hybrid-­‐
bill	   procedure	   on	   the	   ground	   that	   it	   would	   fail	   to	   comply	   with	   requirements	   laid	   down	   in	   the	  
European	  Union’s	  Environmental	   Impact	  Directive.10	  In	  particular,	   the	  claimants	   relied	  upon	  article	  
6(4)	  of	  the	  Directive,	  which	  requires	  the	  public	  to	  be	  afforded	  ‘early	  and	  effective	  opportunities	  to	  
participate	   in	   the	   [relevant]	   environmental	   decision-­‐making	   procedures’.	   Although	   the	   Directive	  
confers	  an	  exemption	   in	   relation	   to	   ‘projects	   the	  details	  of	  which	  are	  adopted	  by	  a	   specific	   act	  of	  
national	  legislation’,	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice	  has	  ruled	  that	  the	  exemption	  can	  be	  relied	  upon	  only	  when	  
the	   legislative	   process	   fulfills	   the	   objectives	   of	   the	   Directive.11	  Citing	   the	   role	   that	   party-­‐political	  
factors	  would	  probably	  play	  in	  parliamentary	  scrutiny,	  the	  limited	  time	  available	  for	  consideration	  of	  
the	  likely	  voluminous	  environmental	  information	  with	  which	  Parliament	  would	  be	  supplied,	  and	  the	  
improbability	   of	   Members	   of	   Parliament	   adequately	   digesting	   that	   information,	   the	   claimants	  
contended	   that	   the	   hybrid-­‐bill	   procedure	   would	   fail	   to	   satisfy	   the	   Directive’s	   requirement	   of	  
participative	  decision-­‐making.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  Deputy	  President	  of	  the	  Supreme	  Court.	  	  
6	  Supra,	  n.	  1,	  para.	  130.	  	  
7	  Hansard	  (HC	  Debates),	  10	  December	  1962,	  vol.	  669,	  col.	  45.	  
8	  Justice	  of	  the	  Supreme	  Court.	  	  
9	  Supra	  n.	  1,	  para.	  57.	  	  
10	  Parliament	  and	  Council	  Directive	  2011/92/EU.	  	  
11	  See,	  e.g.,	  Joined	  Cases	  C-­‐128/09	  to	  C-­‐131/09,	  C-­‐134/09	  and	  C-­‐135/09,	  Boxus	  v	  Région	  Wallonne	  [2011]	  ECR	  I-­‐
9711.	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Those	  arguments	  were	  rejected	  by	  the	  Supreme	  Court.12	  However,	  neither	  that	  conclusion	  nor	  the	  
reasons	   for	   it	   are,	   for	   present	   purposes,	   the	   most	   important	   aspect	   of	   the	   case.	   Rather,	   its	  
significance	  lies	   in	  the	  way	  in	  which	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  dealt	  with	  the	  argument	  that	   it	  should	  not	  
even	  consider	  whether	   the	  hybrid-­‐bill	  procedure	  complied	  with	  EU	   law.	  The	  nub	  of	   that	  argument	  
was	  that	  for	  a	  court	  to	  measure	  the	  adequacy	  of	  the	  legislative	  process	  against	  the	  benchmarks	  set	  
out	   in	  the	  Directive	  would	  be	  constitutionally	   improper,	  because	  it	  would	   impinge	  upon	  what	  Lord	  
Reed	  JSC	  described	  as	  ‘long-­‐established	  constitutional	  principles	  governing	  the	  relationship	  between	  
Parliament	  and	  the	  courts,	  as	  reflected	  for	  example	  in	  article	  9	  of	  the	  Bill	  of	  Rights	  1689’.13	  According	  
to	   that	   provision,	   parliamentary	   proceedings	   ‘ought	   not	   to	   be	   impeached	   or	   questioned	   in	   any	  
court’—an	  injunction	  of	  which,	  it	  was	  argued,	  judicial	  scrutiny	  of	  the	  hybrid-­‐bill	  procedure	  would	  fall	  
foul.	  	  
That	  argument	  did	  not	  succeed	  before	  the	  Supreme	  Court.	  However,	  in	  the	  course	  of	  deciding	  that	  
scrutiny	  of	  the	  hybrid-­‐bill	  procedure	  would	  not	  breach	  the	  constitutional	  principle	  reflected	  in	  article	  
9	  of	  the	  Bill	  of	  Rights,	  the	  Court	  had	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  contention	  that	  the	  article	  9	  principle	  was	   in	  
any	   event	   inapplicable.	   That	   contention	   rested	  upon	   the	   assertion	   that	   the	   article	   9	   principle	   had	  
been	   swept	   away	   by	   EU	   law	   to	   the	   extent	   that	   its	   application	   would	   prevent	   the	   court	   from	  
determining	  whether	   the	   procedure	   complied	  with	   the	  Directive.	   The	   essence	   of	   the	   argument	   is	  
apparent	   from	   the	   following	   extract	   from	   the	   joint	   judgment	   of	   Lord	   Neuberger	   PSC14	  and	   Lord	  
Mance	  JSC:	  	  
The	  United	  Kingdom	  has	  no	  written	  constitution,	  but	  we	  have	  a	  number	  of	  constitutional	  instruments.	  
They	  include	  Magna	  Carta,	  the	  Petition	  of	  Right	  1628,	  the	  Bill	  of	  Rights	  and	  (in	  Scotland)	  the	  Claim	  of	  
Rights	  Act	  1689	  ,	  the	  Act	  of	  Settlement	  1701	  and	  the	  Act	  of	  Union	  1707.	  The	  European	  Communities	  
Act	  1972,	  the	  Human	  Rights	  Act	  1998	  and	  the	  Constitutional	  Reform	  Act	  2005	  may	  now	  be	  added	  to	  
this	  list.	  The	  common	  law	  itself	  also	  recognises	  certain	  principles	  as	  fundamental	  to	  the	  rule	  of	  law.	  It	  
is,	  putting	  the	  point	  at	   its	   lowest,	  certainly	  arguable	  (and	  it	   is	  for	  United	  Kingdom	  law	  and	  courts	  to	  
determine)	   that	   there	   may	   be	   fundamental	   principles,	   whether	   contained	   in	   other	   constitutional	  
instruments	   or	   recognised	   at	   common	   law,	   of	   which	   Parliament	   when	   it	   enacted	   the	   European	  
Communities	  Act	  1972	  did	  not	  either	  contemplate	  or	  authorise	  the	  abrogation.15	  
It	  is	  the	  Court’s	  treatment	  of	  this	  argument	  that	  lies	  at	  the	  constitutional	  heart	  of	  the	  HS2	  case,	  and	  
with	  which	  the	  remainder	  of	  this	  paper	  is	  concerned.	  	  ‘Constitutional’	  legislation	  
As	  noted	  above,	  on	  a	  standard	  Diceyan	  analysis	  of	  the	  British	  constitution,	  all	  Acts	  of	  Parliament	  are	  
equal	  in	  legal	  status.	  However,	  this	  orthodox	  view	  is	  challenged	  by	  the	  Supreme	  Court’s	  judgment	  in	  
HS2.	   In	   particular,	   it	   is	   challenged	   by	   the	   way	   in	   which	   the	   Supreme	   Court	   approached	   the	   key	  
question	  concerning	  the	  relationship	  between	  UK	  and	  EU	  law.	  That	  question	  arose	  because,	  as	  we	  
have	   seen,	   it	  was	   argued	   that	  UK	   law	   in	   the	   form	  of	   article	   9	   of	   the	  Bill	   of	   Rights,	   or	   at	   least	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12	  At	  the	  time	  of	  writing,	  the	  Bill—the	  High	  Speed	  Rail	  (London—West	  Midlands)	  Bill—is	  before	  Parliament.	  	  
13	  Supra	  n.	  1,	  para.	  78.	  	  
14	  President	  of	  the	  Supreme	  Court.	  	  
15	  Supra,	  n.	  1,	  para.	  207.	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principle	  reflected	  in	  it,16	  was	  vulnerable	  to	  displacement	  by	  EU	  law	  in	  the	  form	  of	  the	  EIA	  Directive.	  
The	  very	  notion	   that	  EU	   (or	  any	  other	   form	  of)	   law	  might	  enjoy	  priority	  over	  an	  Act	  of	  Parliament	  
may	  seem	  to	  be	  fundamentally	  in	  tension	  with	  the	  doctrine	  of	  parliamentary	  sovereignty.	  However,	  
as	   is	   well-­‐known,	   it	   was	   established	   in	   the	   Factortame	   case	   that	   EU	   law	   can	   prevail	   over	  
incompatible	  domestic	  legislation,	  and	  that	  UK	  courts	  can	  disapply	  Acts	  of	  Parliament	  in	  the	  event	  of	  
such	  incompatibility.17	  Constitutionally	  momentous	  though	  that	  conclusion	  was,	  it	  was	  accompanied	  
by	   very	   little	   analysis	   or	   explanation.	   Instead,	   Lord	   Bridge—the	   only	   member	   of	   the	   Appellate	  
Committee	  of	  the	  House	  of	  Lords18	  to	  consider	  the	  matter	   in	  any	  depth	  at	  all—confined	  himself	  to	  
the	   delphic	   observation	   that	   any	   limitation	   upon	   parliamentary	   sovereignty	   brought	   about	   by	   EU	  
membership	   was	   necessarily	   a	   limitation	   that	   Parliament	   had	   accepted	   on	   an	   ‘entirely	   voluntary‘	  
basis.19	  But	   since	   the	   conventional	   account	   of	   parliamentary	   sovereignty	   holds	   that	   Parliament	   is	  
legally	   incapable	   of	   diminishing	   its	   authority,20	  Lord	  Bridge’s	   analysis,	   such	   as	   it	  was,	   invited	  more	  
questions	  than	  it	  answered.	  	  	  
The	  HS2	   judgment	  makes	   up,	   to	   some	   extent,	   for	   the	  House	   of	   Lords’	   omission	   in	   Factortame	   by	  
more	  clearly	  articulating	  the	  relationship	  between	  parliamentary	  sovereignty	  and	  EU	  law.	  Rejecting	  
the	  notion	  that	  all	  Acts	  of	  Parliament	  are	  equal,	  Lord	  Neuberger	  PSC	  and	  Lord	  Mance	   JSC—whose	  
joint	   judgment	   commanded	   the	   unanimous	   support	   of	   the	   seven-­‐member	   bench—embraced	   a	  
distinction	   between	   ‘constitutional	   legislation’	   and	   ‘ordinary	   legislation’.21	  Although	   this	   does	   not	  
break	  entirely	  new	  ground—the	  distinction	  having	  been	  suggested	  over	  10	  years	  earlier	  by	  Laws	  LJ	  in	  
the	  Administrative	  Court	   in	  Thoburn	  v	  Sunderland	  City	  Council22—the	  Supreme	  Court’s	   judgment	  in	  
HS2	   confers	   upon	   the	   idea	   of	   a	   special	   category	   of	   constitutional	   statutes	   an	   authoritative	  
imprimatur	  that	  it	  has	  hitherto	  lacked.	  	  
Once	   the	  possibility	  of	   such	  a	  category	   is	   conceded,	   two	  questions	   immediately	  arise,	   respectively	  
concerning	   the	   identification	  and	   implications	  of	   such	   legislation.	  Neither	  of	   those	  questions	  were	  
addressed	  in	  any	  detail	  in	  HS2,	  although,	  as	  to	  the	  matter	  of	  identification,	  Lord	  Neuberger	  PSC	  and	  
Lord	  Mance	   JSC	  did	   venture	  a	   list	  of	   ‘constitutional	   instruments’,23	  one	  of	  which—importantly,	   for	  
present	  purposes—was	   the	  European	  Communities	  Act	  1972,	  which	  gives	  domestic	   legal	   effect	   to	  
EU	   law.	   More	   generally,	   they	   signalled	   a	   degree	   of	   approval	   of—whilst	   stopping	   short	   of	  
straightforwardly	   adopting—the	   judgment	   of	   Laws	   LJ	   in	   Thoburn,	   which,	   they	   said,	   offered	  
‘[i]mportant	   insights’	   and	   amounted	   to	   a	   ‘penetrating	   discussion’	   of	   the	   issues	   in	   this	   area.24	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16	  The	   distinction	   between	   a	   legislative	   provision	   and	   a	   constitutional	   principle	   reflected	   in	   a	   legislative	  
provision	  is	  a	  potentially	  significant	  one.	  This	  matter	  is	  addressed	  later	  in	  the	  paper.	  	  	  
17	  R	  v	  Secretary	  of	  State	  for	  Transport,	  ex	  parte	  Factortame	  Ltd	  (No	  2)	  [1991]	  1	  AC	  603.	  
18	  Until	   its	   jurisdiction	   was	   transferred	   to	   the	   newly	   created	   UK	   Supreme	   Court	   in	   2009,	   the	   Appellate	  
Committee	  of	  the	  House	  of	  Lords	  was	  the	  highest	  appellate	  court	  in	  the	  UK	  (save	  in	  respect	  of	  Scottish	  criminal	  
matters).	  	  	  
19	  Supra,	  n.	  17,	  p.	  659.	  	  
20	  H.W.R.	  Wade,	  ‘The	  Basis	  of	  Legal	  Sovereignty’,	  13	  CLJ	  (1955)	  p.	  172.	  	  
21	  Supra,	  n.	  1,	  paras	  207-­‐8.	  	  
22	  [2002]	  EWHC	  195	  (Admin),	  [2003]	  QB	  151.	  	  
23	  See	  text	  to	  n.	  15,	  supra.	  
24	  Supra,	  n.	  1,	  para.	  208.	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According	  to	  Laws	  LJ’s	  analysis,	  constitutional	   legislation	  can	  be	   identified	  on	  a	  functional	  basis—it	  
‘conditions	  the	  legal	  relationship	  between	  citizen	  and	  the	  State	  in	  some	  general	  overarching	  matter’	  
or	  ‘enlarges	  or	  diminishes	  the	  scope	  of	  …	  fundamental	  constitutional	  rights’25—while	  the	  significance	  
of	   its	  being	  characterised	  as	  constitutional	   lies	   in	  the	   immunity	  from	  implied	  repeal	  that	   it	  thereby	  
acquires.	  	  
Three	   points	   should	   be	   noted	   in	   relation	   to	   the	   distinction	   between	   constitutional	   and	   ordinary	  
legislation	  articulated	   in	  Thoburn	  and	  endorsed	   in	  HS2.	  First,	   the	  consequences	  of	  characterising	  a	  
statute	   as	   constitutional	   are	   undeniably	   limited.	   Treating	   a	   statute	   as	   constitutional	   does	   not	  
prevent	  its	  repeal	  through	  the	  enactment	  of	  regular	  legislation:	  it	  does	  not,	  for	  instance,	  necessitate	  
recourse	   to	   some	   extra-­‐legislative	   constitutional-­‐amendment	   process.	   Repealing	   a	   constitutional	  
statute	   does	   not	   even	   require	   a	   legislative	   super-­‐majority.	   Rather,	   constitutional	   statutes	   can	   be	  
repealed	   through	   the	   enactment	   of	   ordinary	   legislation,	   subject	   only	   to	   the	   proviso	   that	   any	  
inconsistency	  between	  a	  constitutional	  statute	  and	  a	  later	  ordinary	  statute	  will	  be	  resolved	  in	  favour	  
of	   the	   former	   unless	   the	   latter	   uses	   express—or,	   as	   Laws	   LJ	   put	   it,	   ‘specific’26—words	   of	   repeal.	  
Constitutional	   statutes	   are	   thus	   immune	   from	   the	   normally	   applicable	   doctrine	   of	   implied	   repeal,	  
according	   to	   which	   incompatibilities	   between	   statutes	   are	   resolved	   in	   favour	   of	   the	  more	   recent	  
measure.	   The	  modesty	   of	   the	   consequences	   that	   attend	   treating	   a	   statute	   as	   constitutional	   may	  
suggest	   that	   the	   distinction	   embraced	   in	   HS2	   between	   constitutional	   and	   ordinary	   legislation	   is	  
trivial.	  However,	  such	  an	  interpretation	  would	  be	  wide	  of	  the	  mark,	  not	  least	  because	  the	  shift	  away	  
from	  the	  Diceyan	  dogma	  that	  all	   legislation	  is	  equal	   is	  significant	   in	   itself,	  notwithstanding	  that	  the	  
degree	  of	   practical	   superiority	   ascribed	   to	   constitutional	   statutes	   is	   presently	   limited.	   Indeed,	   as	   I	  
argue	   in	   the	   final	   section	   of	   the	   paper,	   the	   premise	   upon	   which	   the	   distinction	   between	  
constitutional	   and	   ordinary	   statutes	   is	   based	   may	   reflect	   the	   genesis	   of	   a	   more	   significant	  
reconfiguration	  of	  the	  constitutional	  order.	  	  
Second,	   any	   attempt	   to	   demarcate	   a	   category	   of	   constitutional	   legislation	   necessarily	   raises	  
profound	   definitional	   difficulties.	   This	   is	   so	   because,	   in	   the	   UK,	   any	   such	   category	   cannot	   be	  
identified	  by	  reference	  to	  an	  easily	  applicable,	  formal	  device.	  In	  many	  legal	  systems,	  the	  distinction	  
between	   constitutional	   and	   ordinary	   law	   is	   a	   wholly	   formal	   matter	   which	   turns	   simply	   upon	   the	  
question	  whether	  the	  provision	  in	  question	  is	  situated	  within	  the	  text	  of	  the	  Constitution.	  However,	  
in	  the	  absence	  of	  any	  such	  text,	  UK	  courts,	  if	  they	  are	  to	  seek	  to	  identify	  constitutional	  laws,	  have	  no	  
option	  but	  to	   look	  to	  non-­‐formal—functional,	   institutional	  or	  normative—criteria.	  Such	  criteria	  are	  
necessarily	  more	  difficult	  to	  formulate	  than	  are	  formal	  criteria,	  and	  invite	  the	  further	  problem	  that	  
the	   entirety	   of	   any	   given	   piece	   of	   legislation	   is	   unlikely	   to	   fulfil	   whatever	   non-­‐formal	   criteria	   are	  
judged	   relevant.	   As	   a	   result,	   it	   may	   well	   be	   that	   the	   notion	   of	   constitutional	   provisions	   is	   more	  
apposite	   than	   that	   of	   constitutional	   statutes.	   At	   the	   very	   least,	   it	   is	   clear	   that	   if	   the	   notion	   of	  
constitutional	   ‘measures’	   (as	   Lord	  Neuberger	  PSC	  and	  Lord	  Mance	   JSC	  put	   it	   in	  HS2)	   is	   to	  develop	  
into	  a	  meaningful	  one,	  then	  a	  good	  deal	  of	  definitional	  work	  remains	  to	  be	  done	  by	  UK	  courts.27	  This	  
raises	   the	   question—explored	   further	   below—whether	   a	   sharp,	   binary	   distinction	   between	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25	  Supra,	  n.	  22,	  para.	  62.	  	  
26	  Supra,	  n.	  22,	  para.	  63.	  
27	  See	  further	  D.	  Feldman,	  ‘The	  nature	  and	  significance	  of	  “constitutional”	  legislation’,	  129	  LQR	  (2013)	  p.	  343.	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constitutional	  and	  ordinary	  legislation	  is	  appropriate	  in	  a	  system,	  like	  that	  of	  the	  UK,	  that	  lacks	  the	  
formalist	  tools	  which	  are	  arguably	  necessary	  to	  sustain	  such	  an	  approach.	  	  
Third,	  although	  the	  approach	  adopted	  in	  Thoburn	  and	  embraced	  in	  HS2	  is,	  as	  can	  be	  seen	  from	  the	  
foregoing	  discussion,	  highly	  inchoate	  at	  the	  present	  time,	  it	  is	  does	  have	  considerable	  potential	  as	  an	  
analytical	  device.	  In	  particular,	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  it	  supplies	  an	  escape	  route	  from	  the	  unrelentingly	  
flat	   nature	   of	   the	   Diceyan	   constitution,	   it	   facilitates	   an	   understanding	   of	   the	   constitution	   that	  
acknowledges,	  at	   least	  to	  some	  degree,	  a	  hierarchical	  ordering	  of	  norms.	  This	  can	  be	  illustrated	  by	  
reference	   to	   the	   specific	   context,	   concerning	   the	   relationship	  between	  EU	  and	  domestic	   law,	  with	  
which	  the	  HS2	  case	  was	  concerned.	  It	   is	  evident	  from	  HS2—just	  as	  Thoburn	  before	  it	  made	  clear—
that,	   as	   far	   as	   UK	   courts	   are	   concerned,	   the	   relationship	   between	   EU	   and	   UK	   law	   falls	   to	   be	  
understood	  by	  applying	  a	  domestic-­‐law	  lens.	  Thus,	  as	  Lord	  Reed	  JSC	  explained	  in	  HS2,	  any	  question	  
about	  the	  relationship	  between	  EU	  and	  UK	  law	  ‘cannot	  be	  resolved	  simply	  by	  applying	  the	  doctrine	  
developed	   by	   the	   [EU]	   Court	   of	   Justice	   of	   the	   supremacy	   of	   EU	   law,	   since	   the	   application	   of	   that	  
doctrine	  in	  our	  law	  itself	  depends	  upon	  the	  [European	  Communities	  Act	  1972]’.28	  	  
On	   this	   view,	   the	  1972	  Act	   forms	   the	  gateway	   through	  which	  EU	   law	  gains	  access	   to	   the	  UK	   legal	  
system,	  and	   it	   follows	  that	   the	  extent	   to	  and	  conditions	  upon	  which	  EU	   law	  operates	  domestically	  
are	   to	  be	  determined	  by	   reference	   to	   that	  Act.	  Absent	  any	  distinction	  between	  constitutional	  and	  
ordinary	  measures,	  the	  obvious	  difficulty	  with	  this	  mode	  of	  analysis	  is	  that	  post-­‐1972	  legislation	  that	  
is	  incompatible	  with	  EU	  law	  ought	  to	  be	  accorded	  priority	  by	  application	  of	  the	  doctrine	  of	  implied	  
repeal,	   subsequent	   domestic	   legislation	   that	   is	   incompatible	   with	   EU	   law	   operating	   to	   implicitly	  
narrow	  the	  ECA	  gateway.	  However,	  once	  the	  ECA	   is	  characterised	  as	  a	  constitutional	  statute,29	  the	  
relationship	   between	   it	   and	   any	   other,	   EU-­‐incompatible	   legislation	   can	   be	   conceived	   of	   in	  
hierarchical	   terms,	   such	   that	   the	   gateway	   created	   by	   the	   constitutional	   ECA	   is	   resistant	   to	  
subsequent	   legislation	   that	   is	   merely	   implicitly	   incompatible	   with	   EU	   law.	   Projected	   back	   onto	  
Factortame,	   this	  analysis	  suggests	   that	  EU	   law	  secured	  priority	   in	   that	  case	  because	  the	   impugned	  
domestic	  legislation	  was	  only	  implicitly	  inconsistent	  with	  EU	  law,	  and	  therefore	  failed—through	  the	  
lack	  of	  relevant	  explicit	  provision—to	  narrow	  the	  gateway	  erected	  by	  the	  constitutional	  ECA.	  	  From	  a	  binary	  to	  a	  more	  nuanced	  notion	  of	  constitutional	  hierarchy	  	  
Whereas	   Factortame	  was	   concerned	   with	   the	   relationship	   between	   a	   constitutional	   statute	   (the	  
ECA)	   and	   a	   subsequent	   ordinary	   statute,	   HS2	   was	   concerned	   with	   the	   relationship	   between	   a	  
constitutional	   statute	   (the	   ECA	   again)	   and	   an	   earlier	   constitutional	   statute.	   Did	   the	   constitutional	  
status	  of	   the	  European	  Communities	  Act	  1972	  mean	  that	   it—and	  therefore	  EU	   law	  given	  effect	  by	  
it—could	  take	  priority	  over	  the	  Bill	  of	  Rights	  1689?	  	  
There	  are	  several	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  relationship	  between	  constitutional	  statutes	  inter	  se—a	  matter	  
that	  Thoburn	  did	  not	  address—might	  be	  understood.	  On	  one	  view,	  any	  conflict	  between	  two	  such	  
statutes	  might	  fall	  to	  be	  resolved	  on	  a	  normal	  implied-­‐repeal	  basis,	  the	  constitutional	  status	  of	  the	  
two	  statutes	  cancelling	  out	   the	  significance	  of	   their	  being	  constitutional	   statutes	   in	   the	   first	  place.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28	  Supra,	  n.	  1,	  para.	  79.	  This	  view	  is	  consistent	  with	  the	  position	  set	  out	  by	  Parliament	   itself	   in	  the	  European	  
Union	  Act	  2011,	  s.	  18.	  	  
29	  Or	  at	  least	  once	  the	  relevant	  provision	  within	  the	  Act	  is	  characterized	  as	  a	  constitutional	  measure.	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Thus	  the	  more	  recent	  ECA—and	  the	  EU	  law	  given	  effect	  by	   it—would	  be	  capable	  of	  overriding	  the	  
earlier	   Bill	   of	   Rights.	   Alternatively,	   the	   conflict	  between	   two	   constitutional	   statutes	   might	   be	  
resolved	  by	  applying	  the	  principle	  that	  constitutional	  statutes	  are	  not	  susceptible	  to	  implied	  repeal	  
irrespective	  of	  whether	  the	  later	  statute	  is	  constitutional.	  On	  this	  basis,	  the	  earlier	  Bill	  of	  Rights,	  as	  a	  
constitutional	  statute,	  would	  be	  immune	  from	  implied	  qualification	  by	  the	  ECA,	  notwithstanding	  the	  
ECA's	  constitutional	  status.	  	  
There	   is,	   however,	   a	   further—and	   arguably	  more	   appealing—possibility:	   namely,	   that	   the	   conflict	  
between	   two	  constitutional	   statutes	   falls	   to	   be	   resolved	   by	   reference	   to	   their	   respective	  
fundamentality.	  Of	  course,	  if	  the	  two	  statutes	  were	  to	  be	  regarded	  as	  equally	  fundamental,	  then	  it	  
would	  be	  necessary	  to	  fall	  back	  on	  one	  of	  the	  two	  approaches	  suggested	  in	  the	  previous	  paragraph	  
(or	   to	   adopt	   some	   further	   alternative	   approach).	   But	   if	   one	   constitutional	   statute	   were	   to	   be	  
considered	   more	  fundamental	   than	   the	   other,	   then	   any	  discrepancy—absent	   express	   words	   of	  
repeal—would	  be	  resolved	  in	  favour	  of	  the	  more-­‐fundamental	  statute.	  This	  mode	  of	  analysis	  was	  at	  
least	  hinted	  at	  in	  the	  joint	  judgment	  of	  Lord	  Neuberger	  PSC	  and	  Lord	  Mance	  JSC	  in	  HS2.	  After	  noting	  
that	  the	  UK	  ‘has	  no	  written	  constitution’	  but	  has	  ‘a	  number	  of	  constitutional	  instruments’—including	  
the	  ECA	  and	  the	  Bill	  of	  Rights—they	  went	  on	  to	  say	  that	  there	  may	  be	  some	  fundamental	  principles,	  
‘whether	   contained	   in	   other	   constitutional	   instruments	   or	   recognised	   at	   common	   law’,	   the	  
abrogation	  of	  which	  might	  not	  be	   licensed	  by	   the	  ECA.30	  Lord	  Neuberger	  PSC	  and	  Lord	  Mance	   JSC	  
were	  careful	  to	  express	  no	  concluded	  view	  about	  ‘whether	  or	  how	  far	  article	  9	  of	  the	  Bill	  of	  Rights	  
would	   count	   among	   these	   [fundamental	   matters]’.31	  Be	   that	   as	   it	   may,	   the	   very	   fact	   that	   they	  
contemplated	   the	   existence	   of	   a	   category	   of	   constitutional	   principles	   enjoying	   an	   especially	  
fundamental	   status—rendering	   them	   immune	  to	  anything	  short	  of	  express	  displacement	  by	  other,	  
including	  other	  constitutional,	  legislation—is,	  for	  three	  reasons,	  highly	  significant.	  	  
First,	  it	  represents	  a	  development	  of	  the	  approach	  set	  out	  in	  Thoburn.	  In	  particular,	  it	  signals	  a	  shift	  
away	   from	   a	   bright-­‐line	   distinction	   between	   ordinary	   and	   constitutional	   legislation,	   and	   instead	  
embraces	   a	   more	   nuanced	   approach	   that	   is	   capable	   of	   accommodating	   varying	   degrees	   of	  
constitutional	   fundamentality.	   This,	   in	   turn,	   suggests	   that	   the	   relationship	   between	   two	   pieces	   of	  
legislation	  cannot	  be	  determined	  through	  a	  mechanical	  exercise	  in	  categorisation;	  rather,	  it	  calls	  for	  
a	  more	  demanding—but	  more	  meaningful—evaluation	  of	  the	  respective	  constitutional	  significance	  
of	   the	   two	   statutes.	   Indeed,	   this	   tells	   against	   the	   notion	   of	   constitutional	   (or,	   for	   that	   matter,	  
ordinary)	  statutes	  at	  all.	  In	  their	  discussion	  of	  this	  matter,	  Lord	  Neuberger	  PSC	  and	  Lord	  Mance	  JSC	  
place	  emphasis	  upon	  the	  notion	  of	  constitutional	  principles	  as	  distinct	  from	  statutes,	  the	  implication	  
being	  that	  the	  degree	  of	  constitutional	  fundamentality	  ascribed	  to	  any	  given	  measure	  is	  a	  function	  of	  
the	   significance	   of	   the	   constitutional	   arrangement	   or	   the	   normative	   importance	   of	   the	   value	   it	  
embodies,	   as	   distinct	   from	   any	   particular	   constitutional	   significance	   ascribed	   to	   the	   legislative	  
instrument	  in	  which,	  if	  at	  all,	  it	  is	  laid	  down.	  	  
Second,	  the	  analysis	   in	  HS2	  does	  not	  call	   into	  question	  Parliament’s	  sovereign	  capacity	  to	  interfere	  
with	   or	   displace	   constitutional	   legislation	   or	   constitutional	   principles	   reflected	   in	   legislation.	   Any	  
possibility	  of	  the	  Bill	  of	  Rights	  limiting	  the	  effect	  given	  to	  EU	  law	  by	  the	  ECA	  was	  carefully	  couched	  in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30	  Supra,	  n.	  1,	  para.	  207.	  See	  further	  the	  excerpt	  from	  the	  judgment	  set	  out	  supra,	  text	  to	  n.	  15.	  	  
31	  Supra,	  n.	  1,	  para.	  208.	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terms	  consistent	  with	  respect	  for	  the	  intention	  of	  Parliament,	  the	  suggestion	  being	  that	  it	  could	  not	  
readily	  be	  assumed	   that,	  when	   it	  enacted	   the	  ECA,	   the	   legislature	  would	  have	  sought	   to	  disturb	  a	  
principle	  as	  fundamental	  as	  that	  which	  is	  reflected	  in	  article	  9	  of	  the	  Bill	  of	  Rights.	  The	  implication,	  
then,	   is	   that	   although	   Parliament	   can	   override	   legislation	   that	   reflects	   fundamental	   constitutional	  
principles,	   it	   must	   speak	   clearly	   when	   it	   wishes	   to	   do	   so:	   and	   that	   the	   more	   fundamental	   the	  
principle	  in	  question,	  the	  more	  clearly	  Parliament	  must	  signal	  its	  intention	  to	  disturb	  or	  qualify	  it.	  	  
Third,	   the	   upshot	   of	   this	   analysis	   is	   that	   the	   primacy	   accorded	   to	   EU	   law	   under	   the	   UK’s	  
constitutional	   settlement	   is	   a	  qualified	  one.	   In	   fact,	   it	   has	  been	   clear	   for	   some	   time	   that	   EU	   law’s	  
primacy	  is	  limited	  (as	  a	  matter	  of	  domestic	  law)	  by	  the	  possibility	  of	  explicit	  legislative	  derogation:32	  
such	  provision	  in	  an	  Act	  of	  Parliament	  would	  necessarily	  narrow	  the	  gateway	  erected	  by	  the	  ECA,	  its	  
constitutional	  status	  notwithstanding.	  However,	  HS2	  suggests	  a	  second	  type	  of	  qualification	  that	  has	  
hitherto	  been	  thought	  to	  apply	  only	  in	  legal	  systems	  possessing	  hierarchically	  superior	  constitutional	  
texts	  that	  may—at	  least	  from	  a	  domestic	  perspective—operate	  to	  circumscribe	  the	  impact	  of	  EU	  law	  
upon	   national	   law.	   Indeed,	   the	   absence	   of	   such	   a	   text	   has	   been	   cited	   extra-­‐judicially	   by	   Lord	  
Neuberger	  PSC	  as	  a	  factor	  that	  results	  in	  a	  significant	  difference	  between	  the	  status	  of	  EU	  law	  in	  the	  
UK	   and	   in	   other	  Member	   States.	  He	  has	   observed	   that	   ‘the	   fact	   that	  Germany	   has	   a	   Constitution	  
enables	  a	  German	  court	  to	  say	  that	  German	  law	  sometimes	  trumps	  EU	  law.	  This	  is	  an	  option	  which	  is	  
much	  more	  rarely,	  if	  at	  all,	  open	  to	  a	  UK	  court	  as	  we	  have	  no	  constitution	  to	  invoke.’33	  HS2,	  however,	  
indicates	  otherwise.	  It	  suggests	  that	  it	  would	  be	  open	  to	  a	  UK	  court	  to	  refuse	  to	  apply	  EU	  law	  to	  the	  
extent	   that	   it	  was	   incompatible	  with	   constitutional	   law	  more	   fundamental	   than	   the	  ECA	   itself.	  On	  
this	  approach,	  EU	   law	  that	   infringed	  domestic	  constitutional	  rights	  or	  values	  might	  be	  denied	   legal	  
effect	  in	  the	  UK	  on	  the	  ground	  that	  the	  ECA	  had	  omitted	  to	  sanction	  the	  disturbance	  of	  such	  norms	  
with	  a	  clarity	  commensurate	  with	  their	  fundamentality.	  This	  is	  not	  to	  suggest	  that	  such	  an	  approach	  
would	   confer	   upon	   such	   norms	   a	   degree	   of	   constitutional	   security	   equivalent	   to	   that	   which	   is	  
supplied	  by,	  for	  example,	  the	  German	  Constitution;	  but	  it	  does	  suggest	  that	  they	  might	  enjoy	  a	  form	  
of	  security	  in	  excess	  of	  that	  which	  could	  be	  accommodated	  by	  a	  conventional	  Diceyan	  analysis	  of	  the	  
British	  constitution.	  	  A	  normative-­‐hierarchical	  constitutional	  order	  
The	  HS2	   judgment	   is	   important	   in	   itself;	  but	   its	  significance	   is	  heightened	  by	  the	   fact	   that	   it	   forms	  
part	   of	   a	   recent	   series	   of	   decisions—including	   Osborn	   v	   Parole	   Board, 34 	  Kennedy	   v	   Charity	  
Commission35	  and	  A	   v	   BBC36—in	  which	   the	   Supreme	   Court	   has	   begun	   to	   sketch	   a	   particularly	   rich	  
vision	  of	  the	  UK’s	  unwritten	  constitutional	  order.	  An	  important	  aspect	  of	  that	  vision	  is	  concerned	  not	  
with	   constitutional	   legislation,	   but	   with	   common-­‐law	   constitutional	   rights.	   The	   notion	   that	   such	  
rights	   exist	   is	   not	   novel:	   a	   flurry	   of	   cases	   in	   the	   1990s,	   decided	   prior	   to	   the	   entry	   into	   force	   in	  
October	  2000	  of	  the	  Human	  Rights	  Act	  1998	  (‘HRA’),	  placed	  emphasis	  on	  the	   idea	  of	  common-­‐law	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32	  See,	  e.g.,	  Macarthys	  v	  Smith	  [1979]	  3	  All	  ER	  325,	  p.	  329	  (Lord	  Denning	  MR).	  	  
33 	  Lord	   Neuberger,	   “The	   British	   and	   Europe”	   (http://supremecourt.uk/docs/speech-­‐140212.pdf),	   para.	   34	  
(accessed	  9	  July	  2014).	  	  
34	  [2013]	  UKSC	  61,	  [2013]	  3	  WLR	  1020.	  
35	  [2014]	  UKSC	  20,	  [2014]	  2	  WLR	  808.	  
36	  [2014]	  UKSC	  25,	  [2014]	  2	  WLR	  1243.	  
Mark	  Elliott,	  ‘Constitutional	  legislation,	  European	  Union	  law	  and	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  	  
United	  Kingdom’s	  contemporary	  constitution’	  —	  forthcoming	  in	  (2014)	  European	  Constitutional	  Law	  Review	   	  
10	  
rights,	  their	  import	  being	  that	  courts	  would	  strive	  to	  interpret	  legislation	  compatibly	  with	  such	  rights	  
unless	   the	   statute	   was	   irremediably	   inconsistent	   with	   them.37	  However,	   perhaps	   unsurprisingly,	  
common-­‐law	   rights	   have	   been	   largely	   eclipsed	   by	   those	   enumerated	   in	   the	   European	   Convention	  
Human	  Rights	  since	  their	  domestic	  effect	  was	  enhanced	  by	  the	  HRA.	  	  
It	  is	  striking,	  therefore,	  that	  common-­‐law	  rights	  are	  enjoying	  something	  of	  a	  renaissance	  (albeit	  that	  
the	   judicial	   politics	   behind	   this—given	   that	   the	   HRA	   has	   proven	   unpopular	   such	   that	   its	   repeal	   is	  
firmly	  within	  some	  politicians’	  contemplation—is	  not	  hard	  to	  fathom).	  Lord	  Reed	  JSC,	   for	   instance,	  
said	  in	  Osborn	  that	  the	  HRA	  does	  not	  ‘supersede	  the	  protection	  of	  human	  rights	  under	  the	  common	  
law	  …	  Human	   rights	   continue	   to	  be	  protected	  by	  our	   domestic	   law,	   interpreted	  and	  developed	   in	  
accordance	   with	   the	   Act	   when	   appropriate.’38	  This	   echoes	   a	   sentiment	   expressed	   by	   Lord	   Cooke	  
when	  the	  HRA	  was	  in	  its	  infancy:	  some	  rights,	  he	  said,	  are	  ‘inherent	  and	  fundamental	  to	  democratic	  
civilised	   society’,	   such	   that	   ‘Conventions,	   constitutions,	   bills	   of	   rights	   and	   the	   like	   respond	   by	  
recognising	  rather	  than	  creating	  them’.39	  How,	  then,	  does	  the	  HS2	  judgment—concerned,	  as	  it	  was,	  
with	   constitutional	   statutes—relate	   to	   the	   recent	   Supreme	   Court	   jurisprudence	   signalling	   the	  
renaissance	  of	  common-­‐law	  constitutional	  rights?	  	  
The	   endorsement	   of	   constitutional	   statutes	   in	   HS2	   is	   predicated	   on	   the	   same	   sort	   of	   normative	  
analysis	  as	  that	  which	  obtains	   in	  relation	  to	  the	  identification	  of	  common-­‐law	  constitutional	  rights.	  
As	  observed	  above,	  one	  of	  the	  differences	  between	  HS2	  and	  Thoburn	  is	  that	  the	  former	  appears	  to	  
eschew	  the	  quasi-­‐formalistic	  approach	  of	   the	   latter,	  preferring	   instead	   to	   rely	  upon	  the	  normative	  
significance	  of	  the	  constitutional	  principle	  or	  arrangement	  reflected	  in	  the	  given	  statute	  as	  the	  acid	  
test	  by	  which	  to	  determine	  whether—and,	  if	  so,	  to	  what	  extent—the	  legislation	  should	  be	  regarded	  
as	  constitutional.	  On	  this	  analysis,	  the	  constitutional	  fundamentality	  of	  article	  9	  of	  the	  Bill	  of	  Rights	  
derives	  not	  from	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  Bill	  of	  Rights	  is	  a	  constitutional	  statute,	  but	  from	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  
principle	   enshrined	   in	   article	   9	   is	   one	   that	   is,	   in	   normative	   terms,	   properly	   to	   be	   regarded	   as	  
fundamental.	  The	  identification	  and	  protection	  of	  common-­‐law	  rights	  and	  constitutional	   legislation	  
(or,	   more	   precisely,	   constitutional	   provisions	   within	   legislation)	   thus	   form	   part	   of	   a	   single	  
constitutional	   endeavour	   which	   rests	   upon	   a	   normative-­‐hierarchical	   vision	   of	   the	   constitutional	  
order	  that	  is	  unfamiliar	  when	  viewed	  from	  the	  flat	  constitutional	  terrain	  of	  Diceyan	  orthodoxy.	  	  
It	   does	   not	   follow	   that	   the	   constitutional	   landscape	   sketched	   in	  HS2	   and	   the	   other	   recent	   cases	  
mentioned	  above	  is	  one	  that	  is	  hostile	  to	  the	  doctrine	  of	  parliamentary	  sovereignty:	  there	  is	  nothing	  
in	  any	  of	  those	  cases	  to	  suggest	  that	  any	  constitutional	  value	  or	  arrangement	  is	  so	  fundamental	  as	  to	  
be	  wholly	   impervious	  to	   legislative	  disturbance.	  Rather,	  the	  constitutional	  space	  within	  which	  such	  
principles	  may	   operate	   is	   carved	   out	   by	  means	   of	   the	   presumption	   that—as	   Lord	   Steyn	   put	   it	   in	  
Pierson—‘Parliament	   legislates	   for	   a	   European	   liberal	   democracy	   founded	   on	   the	   principles	   and	  
traditions	   of	   the	   common	   law’.40	  Any	   such	   presumption	   must	   be	   capable	   of	   being	   rebutted	   by	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37	  See,	   e.g.,	   R	   v	   Secretary	   of	   State	   for	   the	   Home	   Department,	   ex	   parte	   Pierson	   [1998]	   AC	   539;	   R	   v	   Lord	  
Chancellor,	  ex	  parte	  Witham	  [1998]	  QB	  575;	  R	  v	  Secretary	  of	  State	  for	  the	  Home	  Department,	  ex	  parte	  Simms	  
[2000]	  AC	  115.	  	  
38	  Supra,	  n.	  34,	  para.	  57	  
39	  R	  (Daly)	  v	  Secretary	  of	  State	  for	  the	  Home	  Department	  [2001]	  AC	  532,	  para	  30.	  	  
40	  Pierson,	  supra,	  n.	  37,	  p.	  587.	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legislation	   framed	   in	   suitably	   clear	   terms.	   However,	   the	   fact	   that	   Parliament	   may	   be	   capable	   of	  
displacing	   constitutional	   values	   should	   not	   be	   allowed	   to	   obscure	   the	   fact	   that	   they	   have	   a	  
constitutional	   existence	   independent	  of	   any	  exercise	  of	   legislative	  will.	   Rather,	   they	   reflect	   a	   legal	  
dimension	  of	  the	  constitution	  that	  forms	  a	  crucial	  part	  of	  the	  backdrop	  against	  which	  legislation	  falls	  
to	  be	  interpreted.	  This	  analysis	  is	  consistent	  with	  the	  view	  of	  writers	  such	  as	  Trevor	  Allan,	  who	  has	  
argued	  that,	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  the	  HRA	  has	  been	  embraced	  by	  the	  courts,	  this	  must	  be,	  at	  least	  in	  
part,	   because	   ‘it	  was	   planted	   in	   fertile	   soil’.41	  On	   this	   view,	   the	   injunction	   in	   the	  HRA	   to	   interpret	  
legislation	  compatibly	  with	  fundamental	  rights	  is	  one	  that	  requires	  little	  more	  of	  the	  courts	  than	  that	  
which	  the	  inherent	  normative	  compass	  of	  the	  common	  law	  would	  anyway	  direct.	  	  
The	   importance	   of	   HS2	   is	   thus	   not	   confined	   to	   the	   acknowledgment	   of	   a	   hierarchy	   of	   statutes.	  
Important	   though	   that	   aspect	   of	   the	   case	   is,	   its	   deeper	   significance	   lies	   in	   its	   embrace	   of	   a	  
constitutional	   order	   that	   accommodates	   a	   hierarchy	   of	   norms—owing	   neither	   their	   existence	   nor	  
their	   status	   to	   an	   exercise	   of	   legislative	   will—within	   a	   single	   framework	   that	   also	   acknowledges	  
parliamentary	   sovereignty.	   In	   this	   way,	   the	   Diceyan	   gulf	   between	   the	   legal	   realm,	   in	   which	  
Parliament	   reigns	   supreme,	   and	   the	   political	   or	   moral	   realm,	   which	   may	   operate	   in	   practice	   to	  
constrain	  the	  uses	  to	  which	   legislative	  authority	  may	  be	  put,	   is	  bridged.	  This	   is	  so	  because,	  on	  the	  
view	  adopted	  in	  HS2,	  constitutional	  norms	  operate	  as	  legal	  constraints	  upon	  Parliament’s	  legislative	  
capacity,	  denying	  it	  the	  authority	  to	  effect	  their	  disturbance	  other	  than	  through	  express	  or	  specific	  
provision.	  	  
While	  this	  does	  not	  detract	   from	  Parliament’s	  substantive	  sovereignty—since	   it	   remains	  ultimately	  
free	   to	  make	   or	   change	   any	   law—it	  may	   nevertheless	   be	   regarded	   as	   a	   formal	   qualification	   upon	  
Parliament’s	   legislative	   authority.	   And,	   modest	   though	   such	   formal	   restraints	   may	   be,	   their	   very	  
existence	  as	   legal	  phenomena	  is	  noteworthy,	  not	   least	  because	  they	  challenge	  the	  traditional	  view	  
according	   to	   which	   the	   sovereignty	   of	   Parliament	   is	   a	   quasi-­‐political	   phenomenon	   beyond	   legal	  
explanation	   or	   manipulation—a	   constitutional	   given	   changeable	   only	   through	   ‘revolution’.	  42 	  In	  
contrast,	   the	  new	  analysis	   suggests	   that	   the	  authority	  of	  Parliament	   is	   a	   legal	  phenomenon	  which	  
exists	   on	   the	   same	   plane	   as	   the	   fundamental	   values	   that	   are	   immanent	  within	   the	   constitutional	  
order.43	  They	  are	   thus	  matters	   that	  exist	   in	   legal	   relationship	  with	  one	  another,	   legal	  weight	  being	  
accorded	  to	  fundamental	  constitutional	  values	  by	  means	  of	  commensurate	  formal	  constraints	  upon	  
the	  exercise	  of	   legislative	  authority.	   In	  this	  way,	  that	  which	  might	  otherwise	  be	  conceived	  of	  as	  an	  
exclusively	  political	  obstacle	  to	  displacing	  fundamental	  values	  acquires	  a	  legal	  aspect.	  	  
One	  consequence	  of	  this,	  as	  we	  have	  seen,	  is	  that	  the	  primacy	  accorded	  to	  EU	  law	  in	  the	  UK	  may	  be	  
subject—as	   a	   matter	   of	   domestic	   law—to	   qualifications	   analogous	   to	   those	   more	   commonly	  
associated	   with	   written-­‐constitutional	   systems,	   such	   that	   certain	   values—whether	   reflected	   in	  
statute	  or	  at	  common	  law—may	  enjoy	  a	  fundamentality	  rendering	  them	  resistant	  to	  disturbance	  by	  
operation	  of	  EU	  law.	  Significant	  though	  this	  is,	  however,	  the	  HS2	  case	  falls	  to	  be	  understood	  upon	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41	  T.R.S.	  Allan,	  ‘Parliament’s	  Will	  and	  the	  Justice	  of	  the	  Common	  Law:	  The	  Human	  Rights	  Act	  in	  Constitutional	  
Perspective’,	  59	  Current	  Legal	  Problems	  (2006)	  p.	  27.	  
42	  See	  Wade,	  supra,	  n.	  20.	  	  
43 	  This	   point	   is	   discussed	   in	   more	   detail	   in	   M.	   Elliott,	   ‘Embracing	   “Constitutional”	   Legislation:	   Towards	  
Fundamental	  Law?”,	  54	  Northern	  Ireland	  Legal	  Quarterly	  (2003),	  p.	  25	  at	  pp.	  35-­‐40.	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yet-­‐broader	   canvas.	   It	   may	   contribute	   substantially	   to	   our	   understanding	   of	   how	   EU	   law	   impacts	  
upon	   the	   UK	   constitution,	   but	   it	   tells	   us	   something	   more	   profound	   about	   the	   nature	   of	   that	  
constitution	   itself.	   In	   particular,	   while	   HS2	   does	   not	   call	   into	   question	   the	   substantive	   scope	   of	  
Parliament’s	  authority,	  it	  envisages	  a	  constitution	  whose	  normative	  richness	  finds	  expression	  in	  legal	  
terms—and	  which,	  as	  a	  result,	  knocks	  some	  of	  the	  hard	  edges	  off	  the	  notion	  of	  absolute	  legislative	  
supremacy.	  
	  
	  
